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further, if such was the intent whether the retired farmer should be
excluded for the reason that he is primarily engaged in no occupation.
The.amendment provides that a farmer, as the term is used in sec-
tions 4 b, 74 and 75, includes a deceased farmer's personal representa-
tive. Since the farmer is exempted, by section 4 b, from involuntary
bankruptcy, the personal representative would also be entitled to his
immunity. Therefore, it would seem that the sole purpose of this
provision is to permit the deceased farmer's personal representative to
file a voluntary petition under section 74 and 75.30
It is now provided that a farmer shall be deemed a resident of any
county in which his farming operations occur. Formerly the farmer's
residence was a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances
of the case. 3 Now it seems that farming within the county is sufficient
for jurisdiction. CARL R. BULLOCK.
CONDITIONAL SALES
CONDITIONAL SALE - UNRECORDED - PRIORITY OF VENDEE'S
RECEIVER OVER VENDOR
Defendant and McWeb's, Inc., entered into a conditional sales
agreement for the sale of a beer cooler, title to remain in the vendor
until payment of the purchase price. The property was delivered, but
payments were not made nor the contract filed for recording. At the
request of one of the creditors of McWeb's, Inc., one Doyle was
appointed receiver for that company. The defendant was made a party
to the suit with leave to plead and he filed a cross petition claiming the
beer cooler. The Supreme Court held that failure to file the conditional
sales contract rendered it invalid as to creditors of the vendee, and that
the appointment of the receiver amounted to an equitable execution,
and his seizure of the property to an equitable levy. Doyle v. Yoho
Hooker Youngstown Co., 130 Ohio St. 400, 2oo N.E. 123, 20 Ohio
Abs. 17 (1936).
At common law the right and title of a conditional vendor are in
no way affected by the appointment of a receiver for the conditional
vendee for the reason that the receiver stands in the shoes of the vendee
'farming operations' of share croppers or other tenants; and, among these
landlords, to persons who are merely capitalist absentees." See 15 Oregon
L. Rev. 6z (x935).
30 See In re Day, io Fed. Supp. 229 (D.C. Ili. 1935).
31 Collier On Bankruptcy (3 Ed., 1923), p. 61.
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and has no better title. In a number of states in this country the com-
mon law still prevails. Praeger v. Emerson, Brintingham Implement
Co., 122 Md. 303, 89 Adt. 5O, Ann. Cas. I9 i6A 1225 (1914);
Gresham Mfg. Co. v. Carthage Buggy Co., 152 N.C. 663, 68 S.E.
175 (191o). But in other states statutes have been enacted providing
that when a conditional sale contract is not filed as therein provided,
the contract shall be invalid as to certain claimants specified therein.
The Ohio statute provides that the conditions in regard to the title re-
maining in the vendor until payment "shall be void as to all subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees in good faith and for value, and creditors
[writer's italics] unless the conditions are evidenced in writing," signed
by the conditional vendee and a statement of the amount of the claim
or a true copy verified by affidavit, is "deposited" with the recorder of
the proper county. Section 8568, General Code.
The courts have found comparatively little difficulty in passing on
cases dealing with subsequent mortgagees and purchasers in good faith
since the statute specifically exempts them. Difficulty arises, however,
when the interpretation of the word "creditor" is sought. Seemingly
the Ohio Legislature has attempted to lay down a broad, inclusive
policy designed to protect parties dealing with conditional vendees and
relying upon their possession of certain goods. But we find that the
courts, in interpreting these statutes, have hedged in this legislation with
many limitations. These have taken two major forms: (i) limitations
as to the time when the credit relation was created, and (2) limitations
as to whether or not the creditor has had his claim adjudicated and
established by the judgment of a competent court. It has been held in
most jurisdictions that statutes requiring filing are designed to protect
subsequent creditors only and that prior creditors are not afforded pro-
tection thereby. Hamilton Second National Bank v. Ohio Contract
Purchase Co., 28 Ohio App. 93, 162 N.E. 460 (1927), Bornstein v.
Allen, 127 Wash. 314, 220 Pac. 8oi (1923); Gunby v. International
Motor Truck Corp., 156 Md. 19, 142 At. 596 (1928). Contra:
Oester v. Sitlington, I15 Mo. 247, 21 S.W. 820 (1893). This is
necessarily so in some jurisdictions because the statutes expressly desig-
nate "subsequent purchasers" as the persons whom they are designed to
protect. But the courts have also applied this interpretation where
statutes have merely designated the persons to be protected as "cred-
itors." Hamilton Second National Bank v. Ohio Contract Purchase Co.,
supra; In re Atlanta News Publishing Co., 16o Fed. 519 (USCCA.
5th, 1907). As limited by the requirement that one must have had his
claim established by a court of competent jurisdiction, it has been held
NOTES AND COMMENTS 289
that the word "creditors" as used means one who has obtained a lien
by attachment, execution, or otherwise. International Harvester Co. v.
Poduska 211 Iowa 892, 232 N.W. 67, 71 A.L.R. 973 (1930)- In
the case of judgment creditors, this is subject to the limitation that the
judgment must have been taken subsequent to the time when the con-
ditional sale was made. In re Vandewater, 219 Fed. 627 (USCCA.
4 th. 1915)- It has been held that the reason for requiring a lien is
because a debtor may transfer his property in satisfaction of his bona fide
indebtedness without giving any general creditor the right to object
thereto, and therefore the word "creditors" as used in the statutes must
have been used in view of this principle. Malmo v. Washington Render-
ing Co., 79 Wash. 534, 14o Pac. 569, L.R.A. 19 17C 440 (1914).
Certain persons, however, standing in the position of the vendee have,
without having acquired an actual legal lien, been given the status of a
lien creditor. Baum v. Harrison, 9 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 257 (1909),
(assignee); James v. Molster, ii Ohio C.C. 432 (1896), (admin-
istrator); In re Master Knitting Corp., 7 Fed. (2nd) ii (CCA.
2nd. 1925), (trustee in bankruptcy).
The Ohio Court has followed the requirement that attachment of a
lien is necessary before the creditor's rights are superior to those of the
vendor. Hamilton Second National Bank v. Ohio Contract Purchase
Co., supra. It has found such a lien to exist in an "equitable execution"
by drawing analogy from the Ohio rule on the rights of a receiver for
the benefit of creditors as against an existing unfiled mortgage. This
latter rule grants priority to the receiver. Cheney v. Maumee Cycle Co.,
64 Ohio St. 205, 6o N.E. 207 (19O1); Greenfield v. Hill City Land,
Loan, and Lumber Co., 141 Minn. 393, 170 N.W. 343 (919);
Button Co. v. Spielman, 5o N.J.E. 120, 24 At. 571 (1892); Ob-
server Co. v. Little, 175 N.C. 42, 94 S.E. 526 (1917); Cincinnati
Equipment Co. v. Seguan, 184 Fed. 834 (CCA. 6th. I91O). Contra:
Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp., 18 Fed. (2nd) 727 (DCA N.Y.,
1927).
It seems that it should be of no importance what term is used to
designate the taking and holding of the property. A creditor who has
sued out an order in a court of equity that a receiver be appointed and
that he take possession of all the property of the debtor for the purpose
of its administration, sale and distribution, and who has placed the order
in the hands of a receiver and caused him to seize the property, is not
less armed with legal process than a creditor who has caused a sheriff
to levy upon the goods. Indeed, a receiver is armed with a more com-
prehensive and effective process-a process by which all the property of
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the debtor may be seized, administered and distributed. Not only this,
but it is just and equitable that the receiver whose appointment prevents
the creditors from exercising their right to affix a legal lien upon the
goods should exercise that right for them. At any time before the
receiver is appointed, the creditor has the right to levy execution or
attachment on the property. The appointment of the receiver and his
seizure of the property thereunder, however, prevents him from exercis-
ing this right under penalty of being held in contempt of court, Bank v.
Berkingham, 12 Ohio St. 49 (i86i), unless he applies to and has the
court release such property in order that a levy may be made. Croy v.
MarshallU, 3 Ohio C.C. 489, 2 Ohio C.D. 280 (1888).
It was the purpose of the legislature in enacting the registration
laws to require publicity to be given to certain transactions for the pro-
tection of persons dealing with the possessor of the property. Betz v.
Snyder, 48 Ohio St. 482, 28 N.E. 234, 13 L.R.A. 235 (189i). It is
undoubtedly true that one and perhaps the most important purpose of
the act, so far as it applies to creditors, was to protect persons giving
credit to the conditional vendee in ignorance of the existence of the lien
upon his property. But the legislative policy was broader than this single
purpose. It is impossible to say that only creditors who became such
during the existence of the conditional sale may be injured by keeping
the lien secret. It is certainly not improbable that in many cases antece-
dent creditors may be lulled into security and forbear the collection of
their debts at maturity, by the apparently unencumbered possession and
ownership by the debtor of property covered by an undisclosed condi-
tional sales contract. In Thompson v. Van Vetchen, 27 N.Y. 586
(1863), the word "creditors" as used in the New York Mortgage
Statute was held to include creditors whose debts were created prior to
the mortgage. In Karst v. Game, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073
(1893), it was held that when the Chattel Mortgage Statute required
immediate filing a six weeks' delay made the mortgage void against a
creditor, even though the mortgage was filed before the creditor took
his judgment. The Ohio Conditional Sales Act, however, specifies no
definite time for the act of filing.
It would seem desirable that an arbitrary time limit be set for the
requirement of filing such contracts in Ohio. If the legislature were to
do this, the necessity for acquiring any sort of lien by attachment upon
the goods of the debtor-vendee would be obviated. The vendor, by his
failure and neglect to file the agreement within the period specified,
could be held to be estopped from asserting his lien to the detriment of
those creditors who dealt with the vendee relying upon his possession
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and apparent ownership of the goods and the lack of registration of any
lien thereon. HARRY L. BROWN.
DEFAMATION
LIBEL BY PUBLICATION OF PICTURE
A petition alleged that the defendant published an article concerning
a convict in the state penitentiary connected with the Lindbergh kid-
napping and that in the article was the plaintiff's picture with the con-
vict's name thereunder. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the
petition. Held, such a petition states a good cause of action for libel.
Petransky v. Repository Pub. Co., 51 Ohio App. 306, 2o0 N.E. 647
(1935).
A libel is a publication, expressed in printing or writing or by signs
and pictures, tending to injure the reputation of a person and to expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Burns v. Telegram Pub.
Co., 89 Conn. 549, 94 Ad. 917 (1915); Willetts v. Scudder, 72
Ore. 535, 144 Pac. 87 (1914). It is well settled that a libel can be
made by a picture, portrait, or caricature. McGeary v. Leader Pub. Co.,
52 Pa. Super Ct. 35 (I912); Ellis v. Kimball, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 132,
(1834); Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. I
(1921). Motion pictures may constitute the basis of an action for libel.
Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp., 27o N.Y.S. 540, 34o App. Div.
520 (1934)-
In the principal case the defendant contended that since a person
reading the whole article would see that it meant someone other than
the plaintiff, it was not libelous. In support of this contention he relied
on Woolf v. Scripps Pub. Co., 35 Ohio App. 343 (1930), in which
case the defendant published the plaintiff's picture in an article about a
third person involved in an alienation of affections suit, with the name
of the third person under the picture. The court held that the control-
ling question is not whether the article referred to the plaintiff, but
whether it was calculated to lead persons reading it to believe that it
referred to the plaintiff. This is the only other Ohio case in point, and
is supported by Ball v. Evening American Pub. Co., 237 Ill. 592, 86
N.E. 1097 (19o9). There seems to be little other authority for this
proposition.
The court in the principal case, in overruling the Woolf case, held
that the only question is whether the mode of defamation which has
